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Shipwreck and Salvage in the Tropics: The Case of HMS Thetis, 1830-1854 
 
Abstract 
In 1830, the British frigate HMS Thetis was wrecked at Cabo Frio, on the Brazilian coast. A 
British naval force was subsequently despatched to undertake a major salvage operation which 
lasted for well over a year. The substantial textual and visual archive associated with the case of 
the Thetis raises wider questions about the entanglement of naval, scientific, artistic, financial 
and legal concerns in an age of British maritime expansion. If the loss of such a ship brought into 
question the capacity of the British to act at a distance, it also provided an opportunity to mend 
and strengthen the networks of power and knowledge. The sources of error exposed by the 
disaster were to be subject to investigation by numerous authorities, including hydrographers 
keen to refine their charts and sailing directions and Fellows of the Royal Society seeking to 
advance the claims of science, as well as the Admiralty itself, in the judicial setting of a court 
martial. We focus here especially on narratives of the wreck and the salvage of the Thetis, and 
the significance of their repeated tellings of the story after the event; and on the evidential and 
representational status of the visual images of the scene, in sketches, maps, charts, diagrams, 
engravings and paintings. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Among the shipwrecks which have taken place during late years, perhaps none excited so 
much astonishment, or caused so much trouble and discussion, as the loss of that fine 
frigate the Thetis’  
Robert Fitzroy, 1839.1  
 
 
On a foggy night in December 1830, a 46-gun British frigate heavily laden with gold and 
silver smashed into the cliffs of Cabo Frio island, on the Brazilian coast to the North-East 
of Rio de Janeiro, with the loss of its cargo, along with 28 of the 300 men on board. The 
wreck of such a ship was not in itself unprecedented.2 What made this particular event 
noteworthy were the circumstances of the disaster and the subsequent operation to recover 
the sunken treasure. Cabo Frio was a relatively familiar, and usually welcome, sight to 
navigators. But on this occasion, in conditions of limited visibility, the Thetis had steered a 
course which took it directly onto the rocks (Figure 1). Disabled by the violent impact, 
which destroyed all three of its masts, the ship had drifted along the coast and eventually 
sunk in a small cove in deep water beneath the cliffs of the island. All was not lost, 
however: in a remarkable series of salvage operations in the months which followed, a 
large proportion of the freight was retrieved from the sea-bed, weighed and packed up for 
the onward journey to England. 
Based on the Royal Navy’s South American station, the Thetis was wrecked soon 
after leaving the harbour of Rio de Janeiro, having previously called at the Pacific ports of 
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Guayaquil, Callao and Valparaiso. The value of the ship’s freight of bullion and coins – 
estimated to be worth over $800,000 (£160,000) – provided a strong incentive for the 
salvage efforts at Cabo Frio, which lasted over 18 months. The first to volunteer his 
services (and those of his crew) was Captain Thomas Dickinson, who at the time of the 
disaster had just arrived at Rio de Janeiro after a voyage on another ship from the Pacific 
coast, his ship the Lightning likewise laden with valuable cargo. Between late January 1831 
and March 1832, he managed to oversee the recovery of more than two-thirds of the gold 
and silver from the sea-bed, along with cannons, anchors and a large quantity of naval 
stores, the total being valued at $588,000. However, after a dispute with his commanding 
officer at Rio, Dickinson was then replaced by a younger officer, Captain J. F. De Roos, 
who despatched a further 55 ‘chests of treasure’ to London, worth $161,501, over the next 
five months.3 
British naval and commercial supremacy in the wake of the Napoleonic wars 
depended on the voyages of vessels like the Thetis, transporting goods, men, money and 
information across the globe. If the loss of such a ship brought into question the capacity of 
the British to act at a distance, it also provided an opportunity to mend and indeed 
strengthen the networks of power and knowledge. Hydrographers and maritime surveyors 
were keen to locate the precise sources of error exposed on such occasions, in order to 
refine their charts and sailing directions; while the naval authorities were of course obliged 
to investigate such incidents in order to attribute responsibility and where possible reward 
or blame. On this occasion, a ship had been lost on a coast supposed to be well-known to 
British navigators. Such an event naturally raised questions about the accuracy of existing 
charts, the reliability of surveying instruments and the credibility of the observations made 
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on the board ship. Here was an experiment, a voyage of navigation repeated many times 
previously without incident, which on this occasion had unaccountably and disastrously 
failed. In order to account for this, further inquiry was demanded. 
Responses to the loss of the Thetis took many forms, from the inevitable court 
martial, which took place a few months later on board the Wellesley in Portsmouth harbour, 
to accounts of the salvage operation presented at the Royal Society in London. What is 
striking about many of these responses is their narrative form: the story of the wreck and 
recovery of the ship is told over and over again, in written communications to the 
Admiralty, in submissions to the Court Martial, in papers read to scientific societies, in 
newspapers and periodicals, in legal argument over claims to the salvaged treasure and in 
book-length works such as Dickinson’s own published Narrative, which appeared in 1836.4 
These narratives provide competing accounts of the causes of the wreck and responsibility 
for its salvage, a relentless telling and re-telling which constitutes the after-life of the event. 
Dickinson’s claims to be ‘principal salvor’ – a title which would bring substantial rewards 
under English law – were later contested by his Commander in Chief at Rio, Rear-Admiral 
Thomas Baker, whose own case for reward rested ultimately on the prerogative of his rank: 
as he boldly claimed in a letter to the underwriters at Lloyds in 1832, ‘not a step was taken 
nor, I may truly say, even the most insignificant operation, contrivance or proceeding 
attempted, except under [my] previous orders; or subject to be sanctioned or rejected’.5 
Only after lengthy court proceedings did Dickinson obtain financial reward, which was 
substantially diminished by a bill from the Admiralty for the ‘wear and tear of the ships and 
equipment’. The drawn-out legal disputes over the division of the spoils, which raised 
wider questions about the proper balance between private enterprise and public duty, turned 
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on the relative merits of naval hierarchy, technical ingenuity and physical effort as grounds 
for reward. Dickinson persevered in his claim for nearly a quarter of a century, periodically 
petitioning parliament and ministers, much to the consternation of officials.6 As late as 
1854, the year of his death, the Admiralty was obliged to prepare what appears to be its 
final account of the case in response to a motion in the House of Commons.7 
In a wider context, narratives of maritime loss and recovery could be appropriated 
to a variety of moral, religious, philosophical and patriotic ends. In particular, painterly 
representations of shipwreck scenes during this period exploited a potent and well-
established visual grammar. As Geoff Quilley has shown, shipwreck iconography played its 
part in constructing the character of the British as a maritime nation during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, activating what he calls a ‘structure of feeling… 
which offered a paradigmatic resolution to a host of cultural concerns, through its value as 
an open-ended metaphor compounded by its direct material implications for national 
consciousness, commerce and maritime mythology’.8 One of J. M. W. Turner’s most 
celebrated shipwreck scenes, exhibited in 1805, was clearly influenced by the publicity 
surrounding the dramatic loss of the Abergavenny, ‘one of the richest ships that ever sailed 
for India’, which was also the subject of a salvage operation.9 In the case of the Thetis, 
however, it was the recovery of the treasure rather than the wreck itself which eventually 
provided the occasion for artistic representation (though as we shall see Turner himself 
declined an invitation to depict the scene). In 1833 the marine artist John Christian Schetky 
produced a pair of oil paintings of the salvage effort, bearing the title – ‘Salvage of Stores 
and Treasures from H. M. S Thetis at Cape Frio’ (Figure 2). In the first, the salvage 
operation proceeds unchecked in a cove beneath spectacular cliffs; in the second, it is the 
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sublime forces of nature which hold sway, as a stormy sea rages beneath the cables from 
which a diving bell is suspended. The twinned images provided a conventional study in the 
contrasting effects of weather conditions at a single site, as well as a tribute to human 
perseverance in the face of the awesome power of nature. 
In this paper, we consider various different sorts of narrative and image arising from 
the wreck and salvage of the Thetis: not just finished works like Dickinson’s book and 
Schetky’s painting, but also some of the many sketches, charts, oral testimony and written 
accounts presented in a variety of other contexts. The steady accretion of narratives of loss 
and recovery in the files of bodies like the Admiralty and the Royal Society in London in 
the early 1830s reflected the considerable financial, legal and scientific significance 
attached to the case.10 The archive also testifies to the multiple ways in which knowledge of 
a distant calamity was produced through practices of image-making as well as of story-
telling across a series of different institutional settings. For example, the naval authorities 
considered coastal views and charts as potential sources of evidence about the causes and 
context of the wreck itself: here, the sketch itself functioned as proxy witness in arguments 
about responsibility and culpability. The scientific community, meanwhile, became 
interested in accounts of the disaster partly because of speculation about the magnetic 
effects of iron on ship’s compasses: here charts and maps functioned as more-or-less 
accurate renditions of the shape and pattern of natural forces. The visual depiction of the 
salvage operation, including the effort to represent and recover what lay below the surface 
of the sea, was also of interest to a variety of communities, not simply Fellows of the Royal 
Society, for example, but also London-based insurers who took a close interest in the 
proceedings throughout the operation. In the ensuing legal dispute over the spoils, the 
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graphic depiction of the site functioned as one way of demonstrating the accuracy of claims 
to authentic knowledge of the circumstances of the salvage: thus Dickinson’s sketch of the 
site of the wreck could be described by his counsel in the Admiralty Court as a ‘true 
representation of the cliffs of the said cove or inlet, and the suspension cable aforesaid’.11 
In published narratives intended for a more general audience, such as Dickinson’s, the 
visual image functioned as picturesque support for the text, helping to establish the context 
for a tale of human ingenuity against the odds, on a real-life treasure island (Figure 3). 
The issues raised by the wreck of the Thetis and its aftermath went to the heart of 
the nineteenth-century British trading economy, insofar as the ship itself was the means by 
which wealth, in the particular form of money and precious metals, was transported around 
the world. Britain’s maritime power rested on, and reproduced, practices and principles of 
statehood, science and communication which are visible in the archive through which this 
event was represented in various ways by naval officers, lawyers, scientists and artists. In 
this paper, we seek to use a single case-study to consider the relationships between 
maritime culture, long-distance travel and scientific knowledge.12 The theme of disturbance 
and recovery, and its representation in aesthetic, scientific and institutional contexts, 
connects directly to wider issues concerning the construction of British maritime power and 
knowledge in the early nineteenth century.13 
 
 
Shipwreck and science: accounting for error 
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The wreck of a ship in uncharted waters could in many instances be attributed simply to a 
lack of knowledge of unfamiliar coastlines or currents: the case of the Thetis, however, was 
quite different. ‘Had any seaman been asked’, wrote Captain Robert Fitzroy (in his 
narrative of the Beagle voyage), ‘on what frequented shore there was least probability of a 
wreck, I almost think he would have answered on that of Cape Frio. Yet, against the high 
cliffs of that bold and well-known coast did she run “stem on”, going nine knots’.14  
The outline of the island at Cabo Frio was indeed familiar to transatlantic 
navigators: in the words of a contemporary sailing directory, it was‘[t]he first land 
generally seen, on advancing toward Rio Janeiro from the eastward’.15 The landmark thus 
figured prominently not only in sailing directions, charts and log-books, but also in ship-
board diaries and letters. The first sighting of its distinctive topography was a major event 
on the journey out across the Atlantic for passengers bound for South America, South 
Africa or Australia. After eleven weeks at sea in 1809, for example, Ellis Bent recorded his 
feelings in a letter to his mother: ‘You have little idea how delighted we all felt at the first 
view of the immense continent of America stretching along the sea like a deep dark fog. As 
we approached Cape Frio we observed with wonder and delight its high and fantastic 
mountains, bordered with small rocky islands. The distance from the Cape to the entrance 
of the Harbour is about 60 miles, and is very high land and assumes an astonishing variety 
of appearances’.16 The striking coastal features at Cabo Frio reassured navigators that they 
were on the right track, and provided passengers with a welcome relief from the monotony 
of the sea voyage. They also provided naval surveyors with an opportunity to practice their 
sketching skills, as was the case in 1817, when John Septimus Roe sailed along the coast 
bound for Australia to join Phillip Parker King’s surveying expedition.17 
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In favourable conditions, Cabo Frio was only a day’s sail from the harbour at Rio de 
Janeiro, which had been the headquarters of the Royal Navy’s South American station since 
1808.18 By the time of the Thetis’ voyage in 1830, Rio had been incorporated into a world-
wide network of ports of call and naval stations. British ships based there routinely called at 
other ports on the Atlantic and Pacific, including Montevideo, Valparaiso, Callao and 
Guayaquil, surveying coastlines, supplying stations, intercepting slave ships, collecting 
political intelligence and exerting influence by their mere presence. Prior to her arrival at 
Rio, the Thetis had called at Callao, from where one of its officers had sent an account of a 
six-month Pacific voyage on board another vessel (taking in Easter Island, Pitcairn, the 
Marquesas, and Tahiti), later published in the Bulletin de la Societé de Géographie de 
Paris.19 Alongside their strictly naval and scientific duties, British frigates such as the 
Thetis were used to transport huge quantities of what was commonly termed ‘freight’ or 
‘treasure’ – specie in the form of bullion or coins in gold and silver – from Mexican and 
South American ports on behalf of both state and private interests. Much of this trade 
passed through Rio en route for London, there being no separate Pacific Station until 1837. 
While specie was exempt from the general prohibition on private trade in the Navy’s ships, 
the Admiralty attempted to regulate what was a potentially lucrative traffic by establishing 
fixed commissions for officers, with longer voyages reaping higher rewards.20 
In the narrating of the wreck of the Thetis and of the operations to recover its 
contents, fortunes were to be won and lost. There was more than treasure to salvage, since 
questions of responsibility and reputation were also at stake. Immediately after the disaster, 
the Captain despatched a letter to his superior officers in Rio, plaintively describing the loss 
of the ship as ‘more unaccountable than any thing I have ever met in the whole course of 
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my naval experience’: ‘from all the precautionary measures taken, nothing but the strongest 
current, and the thick hazy weather, with hard rain, can possibly be offered in 
extenuation.’21 In his testimony to the court martial which took place at Portsmouth in 
March 1831, Samuel Burgess attributed the disaster to ‘the wonderful and extraordinary 
nature of the current between Cabo Frio and Rio Janeiro’, claiming that southerly currents 
off this part of the Coast were not marked on his charts or mentioned in commonly used 
sailing directions such as Horsburgh. The ship’s master William Gowdy, who had more 
experience of the Brazilian coast, was closely quizzed on his knowledge of winds and 
currents in the tropics: he too identified unusually strong currents as the principal cause.22 
The evidence presented to the court martial on these points included not only verbal 
responses and written submissions, but also coastal profiles of Cabo Frio and sketches of 
the site of the wreck made on the spot by both the ship’s master and the British commander 
in chief at Rio (Figures 4 & 5). In its final judgement, the court held both captain and ship’s 
master responsible for relying solely on dead reckoning, failing to take soundings and 
making insufficient allowance for the effect of strong southerly winds on sea-currents.23 
However, other explanations were also canvassed. During the 1820s and 1830s, 
authorities on terrestrial magnetism increasingly drew attention to the possibility of 
magnetic effects on ships compasses through ‘local attraction’. As one writer in the 
Nautical Magazine (for 1832) put it, ‘There can be no doubt that many minor currents 
have been stated to exist solely in consequence of inattention to this local attraction; for, 
if those on board any given ship consider that they are steering one course, while, in point 
of fact, they are steering another, there is always considerable danger that the difference 
in the position of the ship, determined by proper observations, and that obtained by dead 
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reckoning, will be set down to current, when no such current may exist’.24 In April 1831, 
just a few weeks after the court martial at Portsmouth, a paper entitled ‘On the errors in 
the course of vessels, occasioned by Local Attraction’ was read to the Royal Society of 
London by Peter Barlow, Professor of Mathematics at the Royal Military Academy, 
making precisely this case in relation to the Thetis.25 While Barlow conceded that his 
paper was lacking in ‘that degree of scientific novelty which is generally expected in such 
communications’, his credentials as an authority on terrestrial magnetism were 
undoubted. The increasing interest of science and the state in this subject reflected an 
alliance of convenience between philosophical and practical concerns.26 At a time when 
iron was being used in the construction of an increasing number of ships, the Admiralty 
had a direct stake in Barlow’s experiments on the local attraction of vessels, undertaken 
with the co-operation of scientifically-inclined naval officers such as Basil Hall and 
William Owen (both of whom had extensive experience of tropical navigation). The 
Board of Longitude had previously awarded Barlow a £500 prize for an iron plate which 
he devised for use on board ships as a corrective to compass errors.27 The Nautical 
Magazine reported favourably on Barlow’s hypothesis concerning the Thetis disaster in 
its first issue (published in March 1832), which described the phenomenon of local 
attraction as ‘an insidious evil, which every ship carries about her’.28 As Alison Winter 
argues, the disturbance to ship’s compasses caused by the increased use of iron in 
shipbuilding ‘made the issue of safe navigation a focus for debates about public expertise 
and authority’.29 Barlow’s researches thus contributed to the so-called ‘magnetic crusade’ 
of the 1830s and 1840s, a well-orchestrated campaign in which the political and 
economic utility of science figured prominently, as well as to a larger and more 
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theoretical project involving the construction of global charts of lines of magnetic 
variation and intensity.30 
The interest of the Fellows of the Royal Society in the fate of the Thetis needs to 
be seen in the context of contemporary efforts to demonstrate the practical utility of 
scientific reasoning, for which the science of navigation could provide ready support. In 
his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, an influential work 
published in 1830 shortly before the Thetis disaster, the astronomer John Herschel had 
painted a portrait of the ideal scientific observer as a well-trained naval officer. His 
paradigm was Basil Hall’s navigation of an 8,000-mile voyage in HMS Conway from the 
West coast of Mexico, round Cape Horn to Rio de Janeiro in 1822, during which the 
coast had not actually been sighted for three months. (Like the Thetis, incidentally, this 
ship was carrying a valuable quantity of freight). Herschel portrayed the plotting of such 
a route as a kind of travelling experiment in which a hypothesis, based on careful 
astronomical observations and mathematical calculations, was tested against the 
experience of safe arrival at the intended destination. If the ship was the principal 
instrument in this experiment, her captain was represented as the exemplary man of 
science. ‘It is needless to remark’, Herschel added, ‘how essentially the authority of a 
commanding officer over his crew may be strengthened by the occurrence of such 
incidents, indicative of a degree of knowledge and consequent power beyond their 
reach’.31 With the Thetis, in contrast, the ‘experiment’ of navigation in the absence of 
visible landmarks had failed, with catastrophic consequences for captain and crew. And 
in this context, perhaps above all others, the attribution of cause and effect was 
inseparable from that of responsibility and blame. 
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Salvage and settlement  
 
The scientific community’s interest in the Thetis case was by no means confined to the 
causes of the wreck: indeed, accounts of the drawn-out salvage operations led by Dickinson 
and his successor De Roos were read at subsequent meetings of the Royal Society in 
February and March 1834. De Roos’ was in fact the first to submit a paper, which was read 
in February 1834 at two meetings chaired by the Duke of Sussex and the astronomer 
Francis Baily. For a relatively well-connected young naval officer, already a published 
author and a Fellow of the Royal Society, such a step would have been unexceptional. 
Dickinson, on the other hand, was a considerably older man, who had fought his way up the 
naval hierarchy during the French Wars, and who clearly could not rely on the same sort of 
social connections.32 On hearing news of De Roos’ paper, Dickinson promptly forwarded 
his own Narrative (apparently written in 1832) in the belief that his role in the salvage had 
not been properly acknowledged.33 Finding themselves in an awkward position, the 
Society’s officers debated whether either of the narratives merited full publication in the 
Philosophical Transactions: in the event, all that appeared were summaries in the Society’s 
Proceedings.34  
The dilemma facing the Royal Society needs to be seen in the wider context of the 
long-running legal case over the distribution of rewards to the salvors, in which both 
Dickinson and De Roos (as well as Thomas Baker, their commanding-officer in Rio) were 
closely involved.35 Here too, narrative was pitted against narrative, as the principal parties 
sought to demonstrate the extent of their active responsibility for originating and/or 
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conducting the operation. What was at issue here were the relative weights attached to 
technical ingenuity, naval hierarchy and physical exertion as grounds for personal reward. 
Both Dickinson and, to a lesser extent, De Roos had spent months applying themselves to 
the task, and both had a direct interest in demonstrating their skill in making surveys and 
designing instruments, as well as their continuous physical presence in and knowledge of 
the site at Cabo Frio.36 Their commanding officer in Rio, in contrast, was acting at a 
distance: while in law he was entitled to a share of the spoils, there was little evidence of 
his direct involvement on the spot. Complaining that Baker was seeking to obtain more 
than his due, Dickinson had initiated legal action to claim the title of ‘principal salvor’, 
arguing that he was himself responsible for originating and developing the most effective 
techniques of salvage. The Admiralty Court reached its decision on the division of the 
spoils in March 1833, but the case was far from settled: the whole question was 
reconsidered on appeal to the Privy Council, which made additional awards in June 1834.37  
While lawyers picked over the claims and counter-claims of Dickinson, Baker and 
De Roos, the Fellows of the Royal Society considered the merits of the narratives of the 
salvage operation presented to them in Spring 1834. Those involved in evaluating the work 
were some of the most eminent authorities on hydrography, navigation and technology, 
including W. H. Smyth, Francis Baily, Mark Brunel and Captain William Fitzwilliam 
Owen, the last of whose testimony was significantly to strengthen Dickinson’s case.38 
Scientific interest was particularly focussed on the technical ingenuity displayed in the 
design of a number of diving bells, air pumps and a large derrick (Figure 6).39 The largest 
diving-bell had been manufactured from two iron water-tanks, adapted by an English 
engineer living in Rio who was himself later drowned during the salvage efforts. The 
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makeshift air-pump used in the bell was devised from the fire-engine and hose of 
Dickinson’s own ship, Lightning. In order to suspend the diving bell from a fixed point, he 
had supervised the construction of the derrick, 158-feet in length, largely out of spars from 
the wreckage of the Thetis herself. Putting the derrick in place was a complex undertaking 
which involved ‘about 60 men slung in the bights of ropes, and otherwise suspended over 
the cliffs at work’.40 In the event, it did not last long, being dashed to pieces in a severe gale 
in May 1831. Thereafter the bells were suspended from cables stretched across the cove, as 
can be seen in the sketch which accompanied De Roos’ account of his own salvage 
operations presented to the Royal Society (Figure 7).  
In the course of the protracted dispute over the credit for the salvage operation, each 
of its principal instruments came under close scrutiny. Dickinson represented the short-
lived derrick as the product of his own resourcefulness and technical skill; his commanding 
officer contemptuously dismissed it as ‘enormous, unwieldy and absurd’.41 While Baker 
claimed responsibility for initiating the design of the bells, Dickinson insisted he had 
conceived and executed the required work. (In 1842, he was presented with a Gold Medal 
by the Society of Arts in recognition of his ‘consummate professional skill and 
ingenuity’).42 De Roos for his part claimed his introduction of new chain cables to steady 
the bells, together with a more detailed survey of the sea-bed and the use of explosives in 
excavating the wreck, had all helped to improve the effectiveness of the operation in its 
final stages.43 The minutiae of claim and counter-claim on such points wearied even the 
Admiralty Court, which was well used to such arguments, as the Judge complained in 
March 1833: 
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This particular part of the case has gone into a detail of particulars, which is almost 
extravagant with respect to the supposed exclusive merit of originating the 
enterprise, and devising the measures that were adopted. The Admiral [Baker] 
suggests the use of a diving bell, – Captain Dickinson claims the merit of 
constructing it from the ship’s tanks; – one proposes the use of the hawse of the 
ship’s patent pump, – the other claims the merit of supplying it; one engages Mr 
Moore, a skilful engineer in the service of the Brazilian government, – the other 
obtains the consent of that government for his employment; the Admiral again, 
constructs a net, made of hawsers and chain cable, in order to enclose the cove, but 
that is said to have proved useless. I will not, however, pursue further the 
admissions and denials on these points.44 
 
The claims of the contending parties in the dispute also extended to florid accounts of the 
physical and mental effects of their labours at Cabo Frio. In Dickinson’s published 
Narrative (1836), the salvage operation is represented as a battle with the elements, on both 
sea and land. Here, as elsewhere, Dickinson emphasised the physical effects of his crew’s 
constant exposure to the ‘scorching sun’ and ‘drenching rains’ of a tropical climate.45 He 
also expanded upon other kinds of challenge, both imagined and real: rumours of tigers and 
alligators on the island, and sharks near the coast, along with constant infestations by 
‘myriads of tormentors in the shape of ants, musquitoes [sic], flies and... jiggers (chicres), 
to such an extent, that one might have thought we had invaded the united kingdom of 
insects, and that the whole community had risen en masse to expel us from their territory’.46 
Initially, Dickinson and his crew had set up tents made of old sails and canvas, but these 
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were soon abandoned, under the effects of tropical storms. According to Dickinson, clouds 
of the fine sands of Cabo Frio were blown ‘through every crevice of our fragile 
habitations… blinding the eyes ands filling the ears’, while the rain ‘descended in such 
torrents that the canvas could not keep it out’. The effect, Dickinson relates, was 
‘particularly distressing after a hard day’s work under an almost vertical sun’.47 
The construction of more robust accommodation from local materials – wooden 
huts with thatch roofs – is poetically described in Dickinson’s Narrative as a colonisation 
scene: the ordering of a vacant tropical space. In the process, the encampment was thus 
transformed into a ‘village’, with separate homes for the officers, a large hut for the crew, 
and a mechanic’s workshop, at the heart of which is a clearing called ‘Treasury Square’ 
where the salvaged freight was sorted and packed under the watchful eye of Dickinson 
himself.48 (According to another account, originally published in the Portsmouth Herald, 
the settlement was named ‘St Thomas’, with Dickinson himself ‘monarch of all he 
surveys’).49 The scene thus pictured was animated by the exertions of the crew – now 
organised into parties of excavators, woodcutters, carpenters, riggers, rope-makers and 
blacksmiths at their forges, in a division of labour dedicated to the extraction of treasure 
from the bottom of the sea. Representing himself as governor of this well-ordered 
community, Dickinson was careful to draw his readers’ attention to what they would 
recognise as signs of civilised and patriotic routine, such as the holding of divine service on 
Sundays and the observance of public holidays. The anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar 
(at which Dickinson had himself been wounded) was said to have marked by the roasting of 
a pig on a spit constructed from a ship’s bolt supported by the remains of one of the diving 
bells.50 
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Dickinson’s personal investment in this narrative, which has many of the elements 
of a desert island romance, is all too evident: for the rest of his life he sought to obtain what 
he regarded as a fairer share of the treasure which had been recovered. But even accounts 
such as these hint at counter-narratives. For example, Dickinson’s painstaking account of 
his efforts to establish a working system of communication with the bell-men working on 
the wreck suggests that his struggle at Cabo Frio was not merely with the elements alone. 
According to his Narrative, signals from the bell were made either by boards sent floating 
to the surface, or by a line: ‘one pull, for more air; two pulls, hold-fast; three, hoist-up; 
four, lower; four [sic], haul the boat to starboard; six, to port; seven, ahead; eight, astern; 
and a quick shaking of the line, attention’. But alongside this agreed system, Dickinson 
later discovered that there was a ‘private code’ by which the bell-men were alerted to his 
own presence nearby. Fearing they might be engaged in their own private enterprise, he 
insisted that they be stripped and searched after each descent to the sea-bed.51 
Furthermore, seen from the perspective of the inhabitants of Cabo Frio, the 
representation of the island as virgin ground prior to its occupation by the British was 
clearly a convenient fiction. At the time of the wreck of the Thetis, the island was farmed 
out as a fishing station, something for which the survivors, who had managed to leap ashore 
from the sinking ship, had reason to be grateful: the day after the disaster, they feasted on 
the salted fish and farinha discovered in fishermen’s huts on the island’s harbour side. 
(These are the buildings labelled as ‘uninhabited’ on Dickinson’s map: Figure 3). The 
waters around Cabo Frio provide in fact some of the most prolific fishing grounds on the 
whole of the Brazilian coast, due to the phenomenon of resurgence which brings to the 
surface colder southerly currents (supposed to have given the cape its name). The mainland 
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village facing the island, Arraial do Cabo (marked but not named on Figure 3), which had 
been used as a harbour since the sixteenth century, had experienced considerable growth 
from the mid-eighteenth century. The news of the wreck of the Thetis was quickly reported 
in the Brazilian newspapers, whose accounts of the local response to the crew’s plight were 
much more favourable than those of the ship’s captain (who complained at his court martial 
of the ‘rapacity and inhospitable conduct’ of the natives).52 Whatever the attitude of the 
inhabitants of Arraial, it is hardly surprising that the encampment of a substantial British 
military force on the island for a total of eighteen months caused disquiet to both the 
Brazilian government in Rio and the municipal authorities in Cabo Frio.53 There were 
allegations that the British were disrupting the livelihoods of Arraial’s fishermen, that they 
cut wood without payment or authority, and that they were setting up fortifications on 
Brazilian territory. In response, the British denied that they had forcibly taken possession of 
the island, insisting that any military presence was required to safeguard the property 
salvaged from the wreck. Furthermore, they claimed that their arrival had provided a boost 
to the local economy, since some local supplies were obtained from the mainland. For his 
part, Dickinson dismissed all of the Brazilians’ complaints, claiming in particular that the 
wood on the island was freely available, and ‘not at all considered property’ [sic]. But this 
stance, reminiscent of fantasies of tropical abundance and availability, could not be 
sustained in the face of further local pressure, and eventually rent for the use of the island 
was paid.54 
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The view from the deep 
 
The charting of coastlines around the globe, including those of South America, was a major 
preoccupation of scientific and naval authorities across Europe between the ages of Cook 
and Darwin. Mapping was an integral part of a wider discourse of field observation in 
which precision was the highest virtue. ‘Whether on land, in the air, or upon the sea’, writes 
Barbara Maria Stafford in Voyage into Substance, ‘from 1760 until the 1830s, we are 
unavoidably enmeshed in an epoch in which spatial discoveries loom large’.55 However, 
there was one field of vision that was yet to be mapped – the sea-bed, the view from the 
deep.56 While the development of modern oceanography is often portrayed as a late 
nineteenth-century phenomenon, dependent on the development of new technology for 
deep-sea exploration, the conceptual and imaginative stimuli for the new science clearly 
have earlier origins.57 In 1769, the philosopher Johann Herder had thus exclaimed (in the 
course of a voyage from Riga to France) that ‘The sea floor is a new earth! Who knows it? 
What Columbus and Galileo can discover it? What new deep-sea diving voyages and what 
new telescopes still remain to be discovered in this wide world?’58 
A more prosaic tone was adopted in an article on the wreck of the Thetis published 
in the Nautical Magazine, in 1832: ‘We consider ourselves fortunate in being able to 
present our readers with so novel and curious a production, as a view of the bottom of the 
ocean, in any part of the world – but here it is strewed with some of its own lawful spoils, 
the last fragments of the poor Thetis’ (Figure 8).59 The underwater sketches on which this 
image was based were said to have been made in the diving bells at Cabo Frio in November 
1831, at a depth of up to 11 fathoms (about 20 metres). Their execution was something of a 
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feat in itself: the very act of breathing was difficult, especially given the intermittent 
operation of the pumps, while torches held above the surface of the water can hardly have 
provided sufficient illumination for drawing. Reporting on the use of the diving bells, 
Dickinson had claimed that ‘the men [said] they could see every object about them with 
great ease’. In March, 1831, for example, he sent his commanding officer a first rough 
sketch of the sea-bed, ‘which I believe to be as nearly correct as the limited angle of vision 
from the small space within the bell would admit’.60 (Similar graphic views accompanied 
papers presented to the Royal Society by De Roos). The engraved sketch which appeared in 
the Nautical Magazine was accompanied by little interpretation: ‘To nautical readers our 
sketch will need no explanation, the situation of the anchor and the keelson will sufficiently 
point out the position of the wreck when she settled down on her last bed’.61 With the sea-
bed so close and the field of vision so limited, the scene lacked a larger context: it is a 
diagrammatic representation, without the aesthetic of the chart or the seascape.62 Moreover, 
the poor definition of corroded objects covered with sand and rubble made accurate 
portrayal difficult, a problem also encountered by the contemporary illustrators of 
archaeological sites.63 
The novelty and impact of graphic representations of the underwater world in 1820s 
and 1830s should not be underestimated. In 1835, for example, a Regent Street gallery 
hosted a ‘submarine exhibition’, whose main exhibits consisted of items rescued from the 
wreck of HMS Royal George by Charles and John Deane, together with twenty oil 
paintings by James Meadows, ‘covering nearly 1400 square feet of canvass’. The exhibition 
was accompanied by a publication entitled Sketches under the Sea, by Charles Deane, 
containing illustrations of underwater work on the wreck, in the London docks and on the 
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foundations of Blackfriars Bridge.64 Such underwater feats may well have influenced 
contemporary naturalists’ depictions of the prehistoric world, notably Henry De la Beche’s 
celebrated cartoon of animal life below and above water in ‘a more ancient Dorset’ which 
was sketched in 1830 and converted into lithograph form by George Scharf. As Martin 
Rudwick has noted, this image was produced ‘two decades before the invention of the 
marine aquarium and the start of the Victorian craze for importing samples of aquatic life 
into the drawing room, where a fish’s-eye view could be experienced through a sheet of 
plate glass’. Its ‘half sub-aqueous viewpoint’, Rudwick suggests, may well have been 
influenced by De la Beche’s knowledge of diving on the Dorset coast, as well as his 
acquaintance with images produced in salvage operations.65 A new perspective on natural 
history was thus opened up as the aquatic environment became more visible. 
Interest in underwater sketches of the remains of wrecks like the Thetis thus 
extended across the worlds of naval technology, science, art and commerce.66 The diving 
apparatus used by Charles Deane, for example, attracted the attention of no less an 
authority than Basil Hall, who published an enthusiastic note on Deane’s underwater 
researches at Portsmouth in the Nautical Magazine for September 1832: ‘When all is ready, 
he very deliberately steps on the ladder, and walks off, under the surface! The effect on the 
spectators is extremely curious, as the bold experimenter is gradually lost sight of, and the 
only indication of his place is a series of bubbles rising over him.’67 Hall’s account presents 
Deane’s work as both a spectacular show and an ingenious experiment: life, and vision, 
under the sea is only possible through the considered application of new learning. This 
image of the ‘bold experimenter’ might also be seen in the context of contemporary 
assumptions about cultural variations in the human capacity to swim and dive at depth 
 23 
(especially as swimming for pleasure only became fashionable in Europe towards the end 
of the nineteenth century).68 The intimate relationship of Tahitians with the sea, for 
example, was a matter for wonderment amongst early European travellers, as a note from J. 
R. Forster, written while the Resolution was stranded on a reef, reveals: ‘Their boats often 
overset, but this is no harm to them for Men & Women swim most excellently, & I saw 
several dive for a single bead, & bring it up from a great distance under Water’.69 In this 
context, it is surely significant that in the early stages of the salvage operation at Cabo Frio 
in 1831, the British did employ indigenous divers, called caboclos, on the assumption that 
their ability to remain underwater for long periods of time would help in locating treasure 
on the sea-bed. However, Dickinson cast scorn on their efforts and doubt on their motives, 
preferring to trust in his own devices. (It did not help that their services had been obtained 
by his commanding officer). According to his own account, he was happy to see them sent 
back to Rio.70 
 
 
Sublime landscape 
 
Whereas the underwater sketch could be represented as something novel, the visual 
representation of the wreck of a ship posed a more familiar challenge to the artist and the 
engraver. Shipwreck scenes were a significant sub-genre of maritime art during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and offered a variety of powerful allegorical and 
iconographical possibilities. The loss of the Thetis, however, was not on the face of it a 
particularly promising subject: instead of being overcome in a tropical storm, or foundering 
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on some uncharted shore, the ship had in unexceptional conditions driven ‘stem on’ into a 
well-known coast. Moreover, despite sinking very close to the cliffs, nothing of the wreck 
was visible at the surface, the masts of the Thetis being shattered on impact. Nonetheless, 
narratives of the salvage operation did dwell on the aesthetic qualities of the surrounding 
landscape: for example, in his account presented to the Royal Society, De Roos described 
the immediate setting as ‘sublime’, while Dickinson characterised the salvage operation in 
his 1836 Narrative as ‘a fine subject for the artist’.71 Several years later the geologist 
William Buckland wrote to Turner himself, sending him a copy of Dickinson’s Narrative 
(to which he had been a subscriber) and suggesting that its subject might be an appropriate 
one for an artist. The volume included lithographs of two scenes – ‘Thetis Cove in its most 
quiescent state’ and ‘Thetis Cove during a gale of wind’ (Figures 9 & 10) – which were 
presumably derived from Schetky’s own paintings. Turner politely declined Buckland’s 
proposal, pointing out that ‘the Thetis is at the bottom of the Sea and the Spanish 
[treasure?] is not to be seen’.72 Though he was drawn in some respects to the idea of fishing 
for treasure, he complained that ‘pictorial misfortunes’ in the stormy view (notably the 
hawsers stretched across the cove) wrecked ‘all chance of grandeur’.73  
The loss and salvage of the Thetis had, as we have seen, already provided a subject 
for the marine artist John Christian Schetky, best known for his portraits of ships and 
celebrated naval engagements, rendered in great detail with lengthy descriptive titles. 
Painters of such scenes had a ready market for their productions, especially after the 
Napoleonic wars. Schetky himself was described as ‘an eminent and loving depicter of the 
wooden walls of England’ by one Victorian critic.74 His oil painting of Thomas 
Dickinson’s own ship, HMS Lightning, now in a private collection in Brazil, represents the 
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ship in some detail, with the distant shoreline depicted in the Dutch style as a backdrop to 
the main action.75 Schetky’s more elaborate works relating to the Thetis were the pair of oil 
paintings, dated 1833, reproduced in Figure 2 above. Whatever one makes of these 
paintings, it is evident that neither makes much of the specifically tropical setting. There is 
no play with the vividness and light of tropical skies, such as one might find in a work by 
William Hodges or Conrad Martens.76 Schetky’s images of the Thetis salvage were more 
orthodox in intent, dedicated to a vision of British endeavour in extreme conditions. The 
lithograph versions of these images which accompanied Dickinson’s 1836 Narrative 
exploited this structure of feeling through their own captions, which treated the principal 
instruments of the salvage operation – the derrick, the diving bell and the suspension cable 
– as more than equal to the forces of nature. In these images, as much as in Dickinson’s 
text, the failure implicit in the Thetis’ shipwreck is redeemed, the self-image of the nation 
salvaged, by the successful recovery of her treasures. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have examined a fleeting episode in British maritime history, an event 
narrated in a variety of different registers, naval, legal, scientific, literary, commercial and 
aesthetic. As shipwreck tales go, the loss and salvage of the Thetis was not  a particularly 
noble or exceptionally dramatic event: on the contrary, the story of a frigate, laden with 
bullion, which smashes full-sail into a ‘well-known’ coastline, is not exactly the stuff of 
romance. Yet in the course of this event, the network of power and knowledge was 
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momentarily broken, and catastrophically: lives were lost, treasure sank to the sea-bed, and 
hundreds were momentarily stranded on a tropical island. How could this be put right, the 
scene re-composed, the story made intelligible? As we have suggested, there were a variety 
of responses. From the point of view of experienced navigators and authoritative 
mathematical practitioners, the sources of error were potentially intelligible, whether they 
were human (the failure to keep regular and precise observations) or physical (the effects of 
local attraction): though the experiment of navigation had failed, there were nonetheless 
important lessons to be learned. The Admiralty, for its part, treated this like every other 
shipwreck as a disciplinary matter: the purpose of a court martial was to measure individual 
culpability through examination of all the available evidence, including narratives of the 
event and inscriptions made on the spot. Shipwreck narratives and imagery in other 
contexts had different functions, connecting the specificities of place and time with larger 
issues of patriotic, moral and religious significance: there, maritime catastrophe might be 
represented in the poetic registers of heroism, tragedy or retribution. With the Thetis, 
however, the story of the salvage ultimately took precedence over that of its loss. 
Our own investigations into the wreck of the Thetis and its aftermath has yielded a 
veritable treasure trove of visual images, in the form of numerous maps, charts, diagrams, 
and paintings; as well as multiple narratives presented in a variety of different contexts, 
from the court-martial to the scientific academy. This multi-faceted archive gives some 
indication of the ways in which knowledge of an episode on the shores of Brazil travelled 
across the globe in words and images. In our account, we have also drawn attention to the 
various sites involved in the production of these imaginative geographies: in beach huts on 
the seashore, from diving bells, on board ship, in the salons of scientific academies, in the 
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offices of the Admiralty, and in the court-room. The power of forms of knowledge which 
can travel have received much attention from historians of science, especially in an era of 
maritime expansion: to this we add a particular concern with moments of disturbance, and 
the recomposition of networks of authority and control through the narrating and visual 
representation of crisis.77 
Our account of the wreck of the Thetis has also highlighted the extent to which the 
representation of distant events varied between different sorts of account produced within 
Britain itself. On the one hand, conventional ways of representing the otherness of tropical 
nature do make their appearance. For example, there are the weird tropical currents and 
extraordinary winds which some supposed to be the cause of the wreck, and in a wider 
context such phenomena did provide material for the contemporary literature and lore of 
tropical travel. Furthermore, those who emphasised the dogged determination of the 
salvage effort tended to highlight the effects of tropical nature on the bodies of those men 
encamped on Cabo Frio island, whose ‘struggle with the vicissitudes of a tropical climate’ 
was accounted for in pounds sterling at the eventual reckoning of reward.78 The poetics of 
the colonisation of wild nature also find clear expression, especially in Dickinson’s 
published Narrative, with its tale of labour and discipline under tropical skies; and again in 
ritual tropes of racial difference which coloured accounts of the relations of the pseudo-
colonisers with various Brazilian others. On the other hand, a specifically tropical 
imaginary is far less evident in other kinds of evidence, notably the coastal chart, the 
magnetic map or the sublime landscape. Tropes of tropicality are thus not always the most 
visible features in representations of the tropical world: sometimes, indeed, the effect of 
visualisation is to obscure tropicality altogether. 
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The wreck and salvage of the Thetis left its own mark on the landscape of the island 
at Cabo Frio in 1830-2, and in the minds of many of those who have set eyes on the place 
since. Charles Darwin, who sailed by in the Beagle in April 1832, during the final stages of 
the salvage operation, described it in his diary as a ‘memorable spot’. So too did the artists 
Conrad Martens and Oswald Brierly, the last of whom followed the practice of many of the 
chart-makers and surveyors who had previously represented the scene, by placing an ‘X’ on 
his sketch of the island to mark the spot where the ship and its treasure had been lost.79 A 
lighthouse was built on the cliffs soon afterwards, probably in response to the wreck, 
though it was located too high to be of much use.80 Eventually, the story of the Thetis 
became part of local folklore, grist to the mill of the heritage industry, re-awakened 
periodically by successive diving expeditions at the site. According to a modern tourist 
brochure for a local guest house which bears its name, ‘Nearly two hundred years ago the 
English frigate Thetis wrecked on the shores of Arraial do Cabo, giving rise to a “cabista” 
population, the fruit of Anglo-Brazilian miscegenation’. Shipwreck tales, in this case the 
story of the sailors who remained ashore, continue to serve material ends. 
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